



Can a Common Currency Foster a Shared Social Identity across 
Different Nations? The Case of the Euro
Buscha, F., Müller, D. and Page, L.
 
NOTICE: this is the authors’ version of a work that was accepted for publication in 
European Economic Review. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as 
peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control 
mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to 
this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version will subsequently 
published in European Economic Review.
The final definitive version in European Economic Review will be available online at:
https://www.journals.elsevier.com/european-economic-review/
© 2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the 
research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain 
with the authors and/or copyright owners.
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely 
distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/).
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail repository@westminster.ac.uk
Can a Common Currency Foster a Shared Social Identity












Fostering the emergence of a “European identity” was one of the declared goals of
the euro adoption. Now, years after the physical introduction of the common currency,
we investigate whether there has been an effect on a shared European identity. We
use two different datasets in order to assess the impact of the euro adoption on the
fostering of a self-declared “European Identity”. We find that the effect of the euro
is statistically insignificant. We interpret this result as suggesting that the euro did
not have the desired positive effect on feelings of European identity. This result holds
important implications for European policy makers. It also sheds new light on the
formation of social identities.
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The euro is far more than a medium of exchange. It is part of the identity
of a people. It reflects what they have in common now and in the future.
European Central Bank Governor Wim Duisenberg, December 31, 1998.
The introduction of a common currency is not primarily an economic, but
rather a sovereign and thus eminently political act [...] political union must
be our lodestar from now on: it is the logical follow-on from Economic and
Monetary Union.
Joschka Fischer, German Foreign Minister, Speech to the European Parlia-
ment, January 12, 1999.
Thanks to the euro, our pockets will soon hold solid evidence of a European
identity. We need to build on this, and make the euro more than a currency and
Europe more than a territory In the next six months, we will talk a lot about
political union, and rightly so.
Laurent Fabius, French Finance Minister, The Financial Times, London,
July 24, 2000.
To millions of European citizens, the euro notes and coins in their pockets are
a concrete sign of the great political undertaking of building a united Europe. So
the euro is becoming a key element in peoples sense of shared European identity
and common destiny.
Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, Speech to the Euro-
pean Parliament, January 16, 2002.
1 Introduction
The physical introduction of the euro on the 1st of January 2002 marked an ambitious
and celebrated achievement in the development of the European Union.1 The introduction
was defended on grounds of financial and economic gains, and there is an ongoing and
controversial discussion of the economic costs and benefits, especially in light of the recent
financial crisis.
However, beside the economic rationale, the creation of the euro had also a political
dimension. European treaties have engraved the aim of an “ever closer union” for the
1This date marked the physical introduction of the coins and bank notes in twelve member states.
However, these states had already officially adopted the euro in 1999. At that time their national currencies
ceased to exist and their exchange rates become fixed to each other. The old coins and notes continued to
be used as legal tender over the period 1999-2002. Therefore, 2002 was the year when Eurozone citizens
practically experienced the introduction of the common currency in their daily life.
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European integration. In that perspective, the adoption of a common currency was seen
as a significant step, creating the conditions for further political integration. Among the
expected effects of the introduction of the euro, it was widely anticipated that it would
foster a pan-European identity, a shared feeling of “Europeanness”, in addition to (if not
in place of) existing national identities. This emergence of a European identity would
create a European demos2 seen as a necessary condition for deeper political integration
(Cederman 2001).
In this study we look at whether the euro has had an effect on European identity as it
was anticipated by its political founders. First, employing a difference-in-difference design,
we investigate whether feeling of European identity increased with the physical introduction
of the euro. To do so we compare the evolution of self-declared European identity before and
after the adoption of the euro in 17 countries of the EU who have already introduced it.3
Second, we also consider a possible effect of the euro through the iconography of its coins.
Unlike euro notes which do not have national elements, euro coins all have a national specific
symbol on one side. We take advantage of a unique dataset on the diffusion of foreign euro
coins in France after the adoption of the euro in 2002.4 We test whether regional variations
in exposure is associated to changes in European identity. Our two studies’ results converge
to the same conclusion. We do not find any indications that the introduction of the euro
did have an effect on the self-perception of European citizens as “Europeans”. This result
contrasts sharply with the expectations of the political actors who engineered the creation
of the euro.
Our study makes two significant contributions. First, it enhances our understanding
of the dynamic of formation of a European identity. The absence of substantial effect of
the introduction of the euro on identity is relatively surprising in the light of the expec-
tations it had raised. This result invites one to reconsider the mechanisms by which a
pan-European identity can spread and complement or replace existing national identities.
It is also important to enlighten the political debate on the political European integration
and the emergence of a European demos.
Second, it sheds new light on the debate about the factors influencing the emergence of a
joint identity. Our results may seem surprising in view of the large behavioural economic and
psychological literature that robustly demonstrates that humans strongly react to minimal
2This term refers to the “popular unit that exercises democratic rights, and as such, is usually thought
to be constituted by a shared identity” (Cederman 2001). See Dahl (1991) for a formal discussion of the
concept in political science.
3The euro has now been adopted by 19 EU countries. The integration of the Eurozone by Latvia (2014)
and Lithuania (2015) is too recent for them to be included in the analyses.
4The dataset we use here, has information on the distribution of these ‘foreign’ euro coins relative to
‘French’ coins.
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experimental manipulations of their perceived group identity along economically relevant
dimensions such risk and social preferences.5 A new shared currency is a strong manipulation
of the experienced boundaries between an ingroup and outgroup. Yet our study suggests
that it was not enough to foster the feeling of common European identity. This absence of
an effect reminds us that the social world differs from a laboratory setting by the wealth of
competing identity-building symbols available.
A paper related to ours is Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2015), who study whether or not
important milestones in the European integration process (the Maastricht treaty, the 2004
enlargement and the 2010 Euro crisis) generated public support for further integration. They
find that these steps reduced pro-European sentiments and trust in European institutions
in general. Guiso et al. (2015) also rely on survey data from the Eurobarometer. They do
however not study the impact of any of these events or that of the Euro introduction itself
on a self-declared European identity.
When assessing our results it is important to appreciate the limitation of the available
data. Even though we corroborate our results with a large range of robustness checks that all
confirm the main conclusion of this paper, it is obviously very difficult to provide conclusive
answers to the question of the causal effect of the euro introduction. In particular using a
difference-in-difference design at the country-level, even after controlling for country- and
time-fixed effects, it is hard, if not impossible, to exclude all possible confounding factors
such as selection into treatment, spillover effects and violations of the stable-unit treatment
value assumption in a definite manner. These limitations have to be remembered when
considering the evidence we provide on the possible effect of the euro on a feeling of European
identity.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 exposes how money in
general, and the euro in particular, can influence identity formation. Section 3 describes
the two datasets used in this study. Section 4 presents our results on the effect of the euro
adoption itself and Section 5 presents the effect of the diffusion of euro coins on identity.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Social Identity and the Euro
2.1 Social Identity and Money
The concept of social identity refers to how people self-define themselves as being similar
to others in a given group and different from people outside this group (Jenkins 2014).
5See for example Chen and Li (2009), Shayo (2009), Benjamin, Choi, and Strickland (2010). A classical
manipulation is the creation of groups according to preferences over Klee versus Kandinsky paintings, the
so-called “minimal group paradigm” (Tajfel and Turner 1979).
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Following Akerlof and Kranton (2000) a substantial amount of work has been done on the
role of identity in economic behaviour and interactions.6
This interest in identity naturally leads to the question how identity is formed in the first
place and how it changes over time. In the case of national identity, two perspectives can
be opposed (Cederman 2001). An “essentialist” approach assumes that a national identity
stems from an underlying existing cultural background (Smith 1986). On the contrary, a
“constructivist” approach sees national identity as forged by institutions and the political
actions of the rulers of a polity (Hobsbawm 1990, Habermas 1992).7
Feeding this debate, experimental research has shown that the allocation of individuals
to arbitrary groups can easily lead to the emergence of ingroup versus outgoup feelings which
significantly affect economic behaviour (Chen and Li 2009). One could conjecture that such
effects also influence the formation of more deeply entrenched social identities (e.g. national
identity) outside the laboratory. However, our understanding of the dynamics which lead
to the formation of such social identities is still limited (Cederman 2001).
In that context, the effect of economic institutions on the formation of social identity
has not attracted as much attention as it deserves. Money is one of such institutions.
Following Simmel (1900), institutional economists have emphasized that trade is a social
link and that by creating the possibility for trade in a community, money is an “abstract
expression of the community” (Aglietta 2002). As such, it is natural to think that it can play
a role in the identity formation of the community members.8 This possibility has long been
understood by political rulers. Helleiner (1998) argues that money plays an important factor
in nation building and state identity. It creates a collective “monetary experience” which
can foster the feeling of membership to a community. Money also practically takes the form
of physical objects, coins and notes, which can be used to convey a symbolic iconography
of the community, typically that of the nation state. Several studies have pointed at this
strategic use of monetary iconography to foster national identity in countries such as the
US (Lauer 2008), Tunisia (Hawkins 2010) or Denmark (Sørensen 2013).
6See for example Glaeser (2005), Bernhard, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2006), Chen and Li (2009), Heap and
Zizzo (2009), Chen (2010), Chen and Chen (2011), Be´nabou and Tirole (2011).
7Habermas (1992) defines nationalism as “a form of collective consciousness which both presupposes
a reflexive appropriation of cultural traditions that have been filtered through historiography and which
spreads only via the channels of mass communication”. Constructivism is well illustrated by the famous
quote from Massimo d’Azeglio after the Italian unification: “Italy has been made; now it remains to make
Italians”.
8In the view of Tajfel (2010), the simple fact to belong to a group, even for arbitrary reasons, is sufficient
to create an identification with this group and lead to changes in behaviour such as in group favouritism.
Money can be seen as a way to create a group (users) which differs in that respect from others, the non-users.
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2.2 A Short History of the Euro and Its Intended Role in the For-
mation of a Pan-European Identity
The euro is currently the official currency in 19 out of 28 members states of the European
Union (EU) and hence used by 340 million people in Europe (as of January 2017). The
euro was first introduced as a new currency to the financial markets in 1999, but it was
not before 2002 when European citizens were for the first time able to physically hold euro
notes and coins in their hands and use them as a means of payment.
The creation of the euro has been the latest major step towards European integration.
In its very early days, the European integration project was characterised by economic
and political ambitions. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951) was an
economic union. The planned European Defense Community (EDC, initiated in 1950) aimed
to form a common European army. The EDC was however rejected by the French Parliament
in 1954.9 The failure of this political road to integration led the founding fathers to limit
the European project to an economic one, for the time being. The economic integration
has widely been seen by its promoters as carrying the seeds of a deeper political union, the
so-called “theorie de l’engrenage” (“theory of the spill over effect”).10
The “Treaty of Rome” (1957) established the European Economic Community (EEC). It
had six founding countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West
Germany). The treaty focused on economic issues such as the reduction of trade barriers
and the creation of a customs union. The economic community was explicitly conceived as
a stepping stone in the process towards a deeper political union, laying “the foundations of
an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe” (Rome Treaty, Preamble).
Over time this movement raised the issue of the lack of European demos to legitimise
this process. To foster the creation of a pan–European political community, the emergence
of a common identity became in itself a goal of European institutions. In 1973, European
Head of States of the EEC adopted a “Declaration on European identity”,11 defining this
notion in the context of “the dynamic of the construction of a united Europe”. Going
beyond a recognition of this notion, the 1983 Solemn Declaration on the European Union
in Stuttgart agreed to promote “a closer cooperation on cultural matters, in order to affirm
9It encountered the opposition of both the communists on the left (wary of anti Soviet plot) and the
Gaullists on the right (wary of defending national sovereignty).
10In his famous declaration which lead to the European Coal and Steel Community, Robert Schuman
stated “there will be realized simply and speedily that fusion of interest which is indispensable to the
establishment of a common economic system; it may be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper
community between countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions. [...] this proposal
will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the
preservation of peace.”
11Bull. EC 12-1973, point 2501.
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the awareness of a common cultural heritage as an element in the European identity. In
that spirit, the EC/EU Commission progressively developed a cultural policy to foster a
European identity (Shore 2006). A visible part of this desire to forge a shared European
identity has been the creation of statehood–like symbols for the EC/EU: an anthem, the
Ode to Joy (1985), a celebration day, the 9th May (1985), a European citizen status (1992)
and a motto, “united in diversity” (2000).
The creation of such symbols may however masks the fact that EU institutions have not
developed “a coherent and centralized identity policy” (Calligaro 2013). Indeed, nation-
states are still in control of the most effective symbols of a collective identity, and the
emerging European identity appears relatively weak in comparison to existing national iden-
tities. In that context, the transfer of a very visible national institution, the currency, was
seen as potentially bringing this reality – a shared “Europeanness” – to the daily life of the
European citizens.12
The introduction of the new currency was formally decided upon in the Treaty of Maas-
tricht in 1992, which entered into force in 1993 (the “European Union” formally replaced
then the “European Community”). Among the 15 EU countries, 12 adopted the euro in
1999 and saw it physically replace national notes and coins in 2002. Four additional coun-
tries joined the Eurozone since then (Table 8 in Appendix A shows the schedule of accession
of EU countries to the Eurozone). Countries that have not yet adopted the euro have either
an opt out (UK and Denmark) or do not yet fulfil all the criteria required.13
The design of the notes and coins reflected the importance of the interplay of European
and national identities in the choice of the appropriate iconography.14 The Maastricht
Treaty attributed the design of the notes to European Central Bank (ECB) and the design
of the coins to the member states (conditional on the approval of the ECB). This division
of labour led to two very different choices for the iconography of the euro. In its design
of notes, the ECB aimed at avoiding national bias as much as possible.15 This led to the
design of a primarily “European” notes devoided of any national reference. On the other
the national states supported a visible presence of national symbols on euro coins.16
12The then EU Commission Jacques Santer explicitly stated: “The euro is also a powerful factor in forging
a European identity. Countries which share a common currency are countries ready to unite their destinies
as part of an integrated community. The euro will bring citizens closer together, and will provide a physical
manifestation of the growing rapprochement between European citizens which has been taking lace for the
last forty years or more.” (Santer 1998)
13Countries who do not have an opt out are formally required to join the Eurozone, but may indefinitely
stay out by not meeting the required criteria (e.g. Sweden).
14The following paragraphs are primarily informed by the excellent history of the design of the euro
banknotes and coins from Calligaro (2013).
15This concern was also one the main factors in the choice of the name of the currency itself, the “euro”
whilst historically meaningful names like “ecu” or “florin” were initially considered.
16We describe in Appendix B the process by which iconography of the euro notes and coins came to differ
7
The creation of a common currency used by citizens across the European continent
with different languages and cultures has been a major step in the process of European
integration. In the political process leading to the creation of the euro, this potential
influence on a European identity was not ignored. On the contrary, it was part of its
justification. More than ten years after its introduction, the data on European citizen’s
feelings of identity gives an opportunity to investigate this potential effect of money on
identity in the context of this large–scale “social experiment”.17
2.3 The Euro and the Making of a European Identity
The increasing salience of the notion of identity in EU politics has motivated the introduction
of questions measuring such an identity in the Eurobarometer surveys (the leading polling
surveys generated and used by the EU institutions). Such questions have been regularly
present since 1992. Using this as well as other sources, a few studies have looked at the
dynamics of the European identity over time. The evidence from such surveys does not
point to a markedly rising feeling of European identity overall (Scheuer and Schmitt 2009).
Large differences in stated European identity exist between countries but for a given country
cycles of rise and fall in European identity are to be observed rather than an upward trend.
In spite of the intended role of the euro as a factor promoting a European identity,
there has been surprising little research on assessing whether it had such an effect. A
psychological study conducted in Austria over the period 1997-2002 suggested that European
identity rose over the period due to the introduction of the euro (Meier-Pesti, Kirchler, and
el Sehity 2003). One year after the introduction of the euro, Risse (2003) argued that
answers on a range of questions in the Eurobarometer survey show an impact of the euro
on European identity. Looking at what happened five years after the introduction of the
euro, Jonung and Conflitti (2008) found a small effect on European identity. They used the
question “Since using the euro, do you personally feel a little more European than before, a
little less or would you say that your feeling of being European has not changed?” asked in
2006. Around a fifth of respondent answered positively. Unfortunately, this question does
not offer a possible trade-off between a European identity and other alternative identities. As
a consequence, it may face a positive bias making any “positive effect” not very informative
about the strength of the actual evolution of European identity.18
in that way. Importantly, it seems that neither the neutral ECB nor the national states designed euro notes
and coins with the aim to instrument its iconography to foster a European identity (Calligaro 2013).
17The introduction of a common currency across different nations has already occurred at other times
in history. Previous examples includes the Latin Monetary Union (1865-1927), the Scandinavian Monetary
Union (1873-1914) and the German monetary union (initiated in 1838 in the Zollverein and leading up to
the creation of the Reichsmark with the political unification of Germany).
18For this reason we do not to use this question in our analysis. We prefer instead the “Moreno” question
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In the light of the importance of the expectations placed over the role of the euro in
fostering a European identity, the number of studies who tried to assess whether such an
effect took place is rather limited. Overall, while a few papers have commented on the likely
effect of the euro on European identity, the empirical evidence is patchy. The data available
has however become richer as many countries have now adopted the euro for several years.
We use this longer perspective to bring a more precise answer to this question.
We investigate here the possible effect of the introduction of the euro on identity. First,
we study the overall effect of the euro introduction by comparing the evolution of self-
declared European identity before and after the euro introduction in the 17 countries which
have adopted the euro over the period 2002-2011.
Second, we investigate a specific way by which the euro could have had an effect: through
the specific iconography of its coins. Euro coins mix common symbols (map of Europe,
stars of the European flag) with national symbols specific to the country where they were
minted. The iconography of coins and notes has been seen as a major tool to shape national
identities (Helleiner 1998). The spread of non-national symbols with euro coins raise the
interesting possibility that the coins’ iconography contributed to blur boundaries between
national symbols or even foster the emergence of a syncretic set of shared European symbols.
Besides, the literature on identity has identified the experience of intergroup contact as an
important factor reducing distance between groups (Pettigrew 1998). This effect extends to
indirect contact (Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, and Christ 2011) where no face to face contact
occurs.19 In that regard, the diffusion of euro coins across countries offered to European
citizens daily contacts with other symbols from other European countries. We use data on
the diffusion of “foreign” euro coins on the French territory to assess here whether regions
with a greater exposure to foreign coins may have experienced a closer connection to other
European countries in terms of identity.
We therefore investigate two different possible effects of the introduction of the euro:
first the effect of sharing a common currency with other European countries. Second, the
effect of sharing some of their symbols of national identity through iconography on coins
with other Europeans. With these two studies, we aim to assess whether the introduction of
the euro may have favoured a common European identity through any of these two channels
(see Section 3) which offers a trade-off in terms of ranking between European and national identity. Re-
spondents declaring themselves more European have to declare themselves (relatively) less attached to their
national identity.
19In contrast to this social-psychology literature, a recent paper by Bisin, Patacchini, Verdier, and Zenou




3.1 Effect of the Adoption of the Euro on European Identity
To examine the effect of the adoption of the euro on feelings of European identity we use
data from the Standard Eurobarometer (EB). The EB is an opinion survey carried out
on behalf of the European Commission and, with some exemptions, is conducted twice a
year during spring and autumn. It is designed to provide regular monitoring of social and
political attitudes of EU citizens and approximately 1,000 individuals from each member
state are interviewed face-to-face every wave.
In choosing a relevant measure of identity, one of the most often repeated questions over
time is the “Moreno” question (Moreno 2006, Duchesne 2008) “In the near future do you
see yourself as...?” with the following response options; (nationality) only, (nationality) and
European, European and (nationality) or European only. This question is designed to elu-
cidate feelings of European identity by asking individuals to rank whether national feelings
of identity supersede European feelings of identity and, unlike other cultural questions, it
has not changed its wording since it was introduced in 1992. We consider this a distinct
advantage of the data. This question is generally asked once per year although there is no
consistent pattern as to whether it is surveyed in the spring or autumn editions of the EB.20
Unfortunately, there are several years where the question was not asked at all (2006, 2008,
2009, 2011 and 2012) but we do not consider this to be a serious detriment.
Noticeably, the “Moreno” question is asked in all EU member countries in each wave.
We therefore observe answers to this question from countries which have not yet adopted the
euro (Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Romania, Sweden, Poland, UK). We use these
countries as a control group over the period when other countries adopted the euro. We can
therefore adopt a difference-in-differences strategy, which assesses whether countries which
adopted the euro saw a rise in European identity relative to the neighbouring countries that
did not.21
In total we are able to exploit 19 waves of the EB spanning the years from 1995 to 2014,
which results in more than 355,000 individual-level observations. Table 1 provides an initial
summary of our dependent variable. It can be seen that the majority of respondents have
either only national or national and European feelings of identity. Few individuals place
European feelings first or feel European only.
In operationalizing this question, we decide to recode the relevant variable into four new
variables that i) treats individual responses as a continuous variable, ii) examines the pro-
20In the first part of our analysis, we control for seasonal effects using dummies.
21The use of a difference-in-difference strategy is important given that previous research has suggested
the existence of a (negative) trend in support for the EU institutions over the 90s and 00s (Calligaro 2013).
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European Identity Frequency Percent
(NATIONALITY) Only 159,821 45.03
(NATIONALITY) and European 162,940 45.91
European and (NATIONALITY) 21,036 5.93
European Only 11,123 3.13
Total 354,920 100
Table 1: Eurobarometer - Answers to the question “In the near future do you see yourself
as...?”. Source: Eurobarometer 1995-2014.
portion of individuals answering “any European”, iii) examines the proportion of individuals
that answer “European first” and iv) examines the proportion of individuals that answers
“European only”.
Figure 1 displays the evolution over time of these four different measure of European
identity for the first wave of twelve countries which adopted the euro in 2002. It shows
that, when the European identity question is treated as a continuous variable, a relatively
flat time trend emerges. However, when treating European identity as a series of binary
variables we see that the proportion of individuals responding that they feel “European
first” or feel “European only” are on a long term downwards trend over time. Clearly, it is
important that we pick up such trends within a question.
Finally, the EB also includes several standardised socio-economic indicators such as
education, marital status, age, occupation and income.22 In addition, we complement these
variables by merging in macro-economic country level GDP and unemployment data from
Eurostat. All of these variables are ultimately statistically significant in our regression
results, however, they do little to change our overall findings. A summary of these variables
is provided in Table 3.
22Unfortunately, income data is not collected in the first EB wave of 1995 and after 2004. However, we
capture these responses via the inclusion of a missing income dummy in our regressions.
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Figure 1: European Identity over time for the first wave of countries who adopted the euro
in 2002. Each panel shows the evolution of a different measure of European Identity built
from the EB question. Source: Eurobarometer 1995-2014, average yearly values.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Identity (continuous) 354,920 1.67 0.72 1 4
Identity (any European) 354,920 0.55 0.49 0 1
Identity (European first) 354,920 0.09 0.30 0 1
Identity (European first) 354,920 0.03 0.18 0 1
Age left education 316,000 18.2 4.81 0 78
Age 350,991 45.32 18.30 15 99
Married 351,024 0.61 0.48 0 1
Occupation - self employed 351,024 0.08 0.27 0 1
Occupation - managers 351,024 0.10 0.29 0 1
Occupation - white collar 351,024 0.11 0.31 0 1
Occupation - manual 351,024 0.21 0.41 0 1
Occupation - unemployed 351,024 0.07 0.26 0 1
Income quartile 117,998 2.48 1.12 1 4
GDP per capita (in 2015 EUR) 527 20254 13622 1000 83800
Unemployment rate 495 8.96 4.28 1.9 27.5
Table 2: Eurobarometer 1995–2014 - Descriptive statistics
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3.2 Effect of the Exposure to Other European National Symbols
on European Identity
In the second part, we use a novel dataset that provides measures of the diffusion of euro
coins of foreign origin into France after the introduction of the euro. After the 1st of January
2002, several projects sprung up that attempted to analyse the diffusion and mixing of euro
coins across the European states (e.g. Euromobil and Eurodiff in Germany, Eurodiffusie
in Netherlands and Belgium). Results from the Dutch euro diffusion project for example
predicted that by 2004 half the coins in circulation in the Netherlands will be foreign.23
For Germany, 52% of circulated 1 euro coins were in 2004 estimated to be foreign by 2012
(Stoyan 2003). Unfortunately, most of these diffusion projects suffer from a selection bias due
the nature of the data-collection. Little financial aid and no official recording of coin diffusion
caused researchers to primarily turn to the internet and self-reporting. A notable exception
was the French Euro Spatial Diffusion Observatory (ESDO) study where researchers were
able to incorporate questions on foreign coin diffusion in general surveys.24
We use this data for our study. The whole dataset collected by the ESDO is composed
of 16 waves of observations between 2002 and 2011. All surveys, apart from the first one,
sampled around 2,000 persons representative of the French population to describe the con-
tent of their purse. At each survey wave, the content of around 1,500 purses was reported,
accounting for a total of 15,000 coins. This dataset makes it possible to measure the degree
of exposure to foreign euro coins in different French regions. We measure the exposure to
foreign coins by their proportion among the coins of the respondents’ purses. Figure 2 shows
such a measure for the year 2003. We are able to observe these differences at the level of
the “region”.25
We use this data, available for the years 2002-2007, 2009 and 2011, to estimate how the
differences in exposure to foreign euro coins may have influenced the way French citizens
perceive themselves as French versus European. Table 3 shows the average proportion of
foreign euro coins in France in 2002 and 2011 at the regional level. The average proportion of
foreign euro coins in each region increased from 7% in 2002 to 34% in 2011. French citizens
have therefore seen a growing exposure to foreign coins over the period. This exposure was
much more acute in some areas than in others with this proportion varying between 24%
and 54% across regions in 2011. To study the effect of this exposure to euro coin, we match
23See van Blokland et al. (2002) and Hochstenbach (2003).
24See Grasland, Gue´rin-Pace, and Tostain (2002) and Grasland, Gue´rin-Pace, Le Texier, and Garnier
(2012).
25Actually, this information is also available at the departmental level. “Departements” are, like “regions”,
administrative divisions. There are 95 departments in mainland France, which are nested within 21 larger
regions. Nevertheless, since the Eurobarometer data is only available at the regional level, we aggregate the
information on the proportion of foreign coins also at that level.
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Figure 2: Diffusion of foreign euro coins in France, 2003. Share of sampled purses containing
at least one foreign euro coin. Source: Claude Grasland, Euro Spatial Diffusion Observatory.
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these local variations with the regional variations observed over time in European identity
(EB question used in Section 3).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Proportion foreign coins - 2002 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.16 21
Proportion foreign coins - 2011 0.34 0.09 0.24 0.54 21
Frequency at least one foreign coin - 2002 0.36 0.12 0.13 0.63 21
Frequency at least one foreign coin - 2011 0.89 0.06 0.78 1 21
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on the likelihood to find “foreign” euro coins in the sampled
purses in French regions in 2002 and 2011. The proportion is measured as the share of
foreign euro coins in purses. The frequency is measured as the share of purses containing
at least one foreign euro coin.
4 Effect of the Euro Adoption
4.1 Method and results
To investigate the effect of the introduction of the euro on feelings of European identity we
estimate a series of increasingly sophisticated models. We start with simple difference–in–
differences estimates around the introduction of the euro, which boils down to comparing
sample averages before and after for treated and non-treated countries. We then extend
this framework to include further time periods and include time trends which in turn is
followed by a more complex model that allows for group-specific, fully flexible pre– and
post–treatment trends of the dependent variable. Our results are in general very similar
across all these models: we do not find any significant effect of the euro on a common
European identity.
As mentioned before, the dependent variable in all estimations is the answer to the
question “In the near future, do you see yourself as...” question in the Eurobarometer.
Our data, and methodological approach, are visualised in Figures 3 and 4. We normalise
time to t = 0 at the date of the euro introduction for each country. We match euro
countries to non-euro countries and normalise the time period accordingly. For the 2002
euro countries, Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom serve as controls whilst Slovenia
(2007) is matched with Hungary, Cyprus and Malta (2008) are paired with Bulgaria and
Romania, Slovakia (2009) is paired with the Czech Republic and Estonia (2011) with Poland.
In building this control group we paired neighbouring countries where possible. To highlight
the difference between the “old” vs “new” euro countries we also present the raw data for
only those countries that were part of the European Union in 2002 in Figure 4.
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Figures 3 and 4 present scatterplots of the average answers to the EB per country and
per year, around the adoption of the euro at t = 0. They also include linear lines separately
for euro and non-euro countries before and after the introduction. Overall, there seems
to be a general slight negative time trend of European feelings for both groups before the
introduction of the euro. After the introduction of the euro the negative trends appears
less pronounced. In addition, around t = 0, there is a jump in the regression lines of both
groups.
To estimate a statistical effect of the adoption of the euro, all our estimations rely on a
traditional difference–in–differences type setup with the estimating equation of the form:
yit = α+ β1Di + β2postt + β3Di · postt + γXit + εit , (1)
where yit is the sense of European identity, for individual i in time t. Di is an indicator
variable if the country adopted the euro until 2014, postt takes the value 0 for every time
period before the euro introduction and 1 otherwise, Di · postt is the interaction of the two
previous indicator variables and Xit is a vector of controls. Finally, εit is the random error
term.
The coefficient on the interaction term, β3, is then the coefficient of interest as it reveals to
what extent euro countries increased or decreased their levels of European identity compared
to control countries post–euro introduction.26 We estimated (1) with and without control
variables and found little impact on our final results.27
However, as can be seen from Figures 3 and 4 our data is not only limited to the initial
before and after time periods around the euro introduction. We make use of many periods
observed before and after by expanding the postt indicator variable so that it takes the
value 1 for any value t > 0 and the value 0 for any value t ≤ 0. We also include a new time
variable, timet, that measures the distance to the euro introduction and takes the values
−7 < t ≤ 13. Its function is to control for aggregate time trends in our data, which Figure
1 and Figures 3 and 4 suggest exist in some form in our dependent variable. Equation (1)
26This estimation disentangles the effect of the introduction of the euro from a time specific shock in two
ways: first due to the control group of non-euro countries and second due to the different timing of euro
introduction in different countries.
27We focus on linear models even though some dependent variables are binary. We do so for two reasons.
First, it is known that nonlinear models typically have problems estimating appropriate marginal effects
with complicated interaction effects. Second, recently linear models have been considered by many applied
researchers as more robust in settings where the dependent variable is non-continuous, see Angrist and
Pischke (2008) for instance. We nevertheless also estimated logit models and found that our results remain
robust to alternate model specifications. For ease of interpretation we therefore only present models based
on OLS.
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Figure 3: Graphical representation of the principle of the estimation procedure. A linear
regression curve is estimated before and after the introduction of the euro. The estimation
can compare the jump and the change in slope around the adoption time between euro
countries and non-euro countries serving as a control group. Source: Eurobarometer 1995-
2014, average country-year values.




yit = α+ β1Di + β2postt + β3Di. · postt + β4timet + γXit + εit . (2)
The interaction, β3, now picks up the average long-term effect of euro adoption by
euro countries relative to non-euro countries and this model thus allows us to test whether
changes to European identity persist into the time periods beyond the immediate “euro
discontinuity”.
However, (2) is restrictive in the sense that is it only allows for a global trending of the
dependent variable before and after the introduction and makes the implicit assumption that
pre-treatment trends are parallel between euro and non–euro countries. In addition it only
computes an average post-treatment level effect of the introduction of the euro. A more
nuanced framework would allow adopting and non adopting countries to be on different
trends prior to the adoption of the euro. It would also allow the euro to have an effect
on the trend of the adopting countries. We therefore further augment (2) by adding full
interactions between Di, postt and timet and finally also estimate:
yit = α+ β1Di + β2postt + β3Di · postt + β4timet + β5Di · timet+
β6postt · timet + β7Di · postt · timet + γXit + εit . (3)
Here our focus is on the parameters β3 and β7. Both parameters are of interest and represent
the effect of the euro introduction on changes in European identity for euro countries relative
to non-euro countries. Parameter β3 represents the immediate change in the level that euro
countries experience in feelings of European identity compared to non–euro countries after
the introduction of the euro, whilst β7 on the other hand identifies the change in the long
run trend of European feeling between euro and non-euro countries post-euro introduction.
The other parameters, β4, β5 and β6, identify a common pre–euro time trend, a divergence
for treated from this pre–euro time trend and the common change in time trend post-euro
introduction respectively. Equation (3) now fully represents our graphical representation in
Figures 3 and 4.
It is important to stress the challenges faced by such an empirical strategy. A country-
level difference-in-difference approach will never identify any effect in a fully convincing
manner. It cannot eliminate with certainty all the possibilities of selection and spill-over
effects. To alleviate such concerns, we carry a wide range of robustness checks. Even though
we do not find evidence for any of these issues to be a concern, we should not lose sight of
the limitations inherent to the data when appraising our results.
Finally, it should be noted that our empirical design faces the challenge of identifying
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the effect of a policy change which takes place in few large geographical entities.28 This fact
leads us to use standard errors clustered at the country level allowing for arbitrary within–
country correlation of errors. However, since Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) it
is well–known that most standard errors, including clustered errors, tend to over-reject the
null hypothesis with a ‘small’ number of clusters. In that sense, the clustered errors we use
could be considered as too small and hence conservative because we do not reject the null.29
Table 4 reports the results from basic difference–in–difference estimations outlined in (1)
where we use only the EB waves right before and right after the introduction of the euro. In
each specification we employ a different coding of the dependent variable as outlined above.
The results suggest that euro countries have statistically significantly higher values of Euro-
pean identity compared to non–euro countries. However, there is no statistically significant
effect on the post-euro term or on the interaction term suggesting that euro countries did
not significantly gain or lose feelings of European identity post-euro introduction compared
to non-euro countries.
Table 5 presents the expanded difference–in–difference results that adds more time pe-
riods (1995 to 2014) to the model and additionally allows for a linear time trend. Results
suggest a fairly similar picture to the previous model; euro countries have higher levels of
European identity than non-euro countries and we now find a statistically significant effect
of the introduction of the euro on feelings of European identity post-euro introduction. How-
ever, only the post-euro term is significant indicating that both euro and non-euro countries
saw a rise of their feelings of European identity over the period. Even here, this effect can
only be observed in two of the four ways we measure identity. The interaction term remains
statistically insignificant indicating that there was no additional gain for euro countries. The
key difference is that these results apply to the total time period 1995–2014 which suggests
that there was also no differentially long-run effect of the euro introduction on feelings of
European identity for euro and non-euro countries.
Table 6 presents our fully–fledged interaction models where we allow euro and non–
euro countries to be on different time trends before and after the introduction of the euro.
Results continue to confirm our earlier findings with euro countries displaying statistically
significantly higher levels of European identity than non-euro countries, however, there is
little effect from the introduction of the euro. As previously identified in Table 5 there is
a hint that the European identity was higher just after 2002 in both euro and non euro-
countries, from the positive coefficient on postt for the continuous definition of our identity
variable. Looking at the DiD estimate of the adoption of the euro (β3), the effects are
28This design is similar to Morton et al. (2015), since we also have observations from units within these
entities. The structure of our empirical section hence follows this paper.
29Please consult Cameron and Miller (2015) for an excellent introduction to cluster-robust inference.
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Continuous any EU EU first EU only
Di, Country has or will adopt euro (β1) 0.300
∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.067∗ 0.016
(0.077) (0.049) (0.027) (0.015)
postt, Post–euro introduction euro (β2) 0.032 0.025 0.004 0.003
(0.019) (0.013) (0.007) (0.004)
Di · postt, “Treatment” interaction (β3) 0.018 0.015 0.010 0.006
(0.025) (0.013) (0.010) (0.006)
Controls
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marital Status Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Quartile Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
GPD per capita Yes Yes Yes Yes
GDP growth Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment rate Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35298 35298 35298 35298
R2 0.109 0.120 0.045 0.029
Table 4: Simple difference-in-differences results where only the waves right before and after are used for
each country. All standard errors are clustered at the country level and given in brackets below. Each
column estimates the same model with a different coding of the dependent variable: Continuous (variable is
coded from 1 to 4, 4 being European only); Any European: binary variable, respondent declare a European
identity; European first: binary variable, European identity rank before nationality; European only: binary
variable, European identity and no declared national identity. *,** and *** indicate p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and
p < 0.001 respectively.
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Continuous any EU EU first EU only
Di, Country has or will adopt euro (β1) 0.162
∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.014∗
(0.036) (0.029) (0.010) (0.006)
postt, Post–euro introduction (β2) 0.076
∗ 0.062∗ 0.011 0.004
(0.031) (0.025) (0.008) (0.005)
Di · postt, “Treatment” interaction (β3) -0.032 -0.031 -0.001 -0.002
(0.041) (0.031) (0.009) (0.005)
timet, Linear time trend (β4) -0.002 0.002 -0.003
∗ -0.002∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Controls
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marital Status Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Quartile Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
GPD per capita Yes Yes Yes Yes
GDP growth Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment rate Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 327400 327400 327400 327400
R2 0.080 0.093 0.029 0.017
Table 5: Difference-in-Difference with (parallel) time trends. All standard errors are clustered at the
country level and given in brackets below. Each column estimates the same model with a different coding of
the dependent variable: Continuous (variable is coded from 1 to 4, 4 being European only); Any European:
binary variable, respondent declare a European identity; European first: binary variable, European identity
rank before nationality; European only: binary variable, European identity and no declared national identity.
The sample ranges from 1995 to 2014. *,** and *** indicate p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001 respectively.
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Continuous any EU EU first EU only
Di, Country has or will adopt euro (β1) 0.174
∗∗ 0.088∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.023∗
(0.047) (0.037) (0.014) (0.008)
postt, Post–euro introduction (β2) 0.074
∗ 0.051 0.016 0.007
(0.036) (0.025) (0.011) (0.006)
Di · postt, Country has or will adopt euro -0.015 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006
× Post–euro introduction (β3) (0.039) (0.029) (0.013) (0.007)
timet, Linear time trend (β4) -0.013 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004
∗
(0.013) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Di · time, Country has or will adopt euro -0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.002
× Linear time trend (β5) (0.012) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
timei · postt, Linear time trend 0.015 0.008 0.004 0.003
× Post–euro introduction (β6) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
Di · postt · timet, Country has or will adopt euro -0.008 0.001 -0.003 -0.003
× Post–euro introduction × Linear time trend (β7) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
Controls
Quarter survey was conducted Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marital Status Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
GPD per capita Yes Yes Yes Yes
GDP growth Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment rate Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 327400 327400 327400 327400
R2 0.080 0.093 0.029 0.017
Table 6: Difference-in-differences with different trends. All standard errors are clustered at the country
level and are given in brackets below. Each column estimates the same model with a different coding of
the dependent variable: Continuous (variable is coded from 1 to 4, 4 being European only); Any European:
binary variable, respondent declare a European identity; European first: binary variable, European identity
rank before nationality; European only: binary variable, European identity and no declared national identity.
The sample ranges from 1995 to 2014. *,** and *** indicate p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001 respectively.
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not significantly positive. The effect of the euro on long-run trends in feelings of European
identity for treated countries (β7) also appears statistically insignificant. There is therefore
little evidence to suggest a jump, or longer run trend break, in feelings of European identity
after the adoption of the euro.30
Overall then, from these primary specifications and given the data at hand, we must
conclude that, the introduction of the euro seems not to have had the anticipated effect on
feelings of European identity, either in the short term (jump) or the long run (trend).
4.2 Robustness and Specification Analysis
We are aware that the previous analysis is based on particular assumptions such as linear
functional forms, specific data ranges and even the type of dependent variable. In this
section we aim to provide various robustness and specification tests that relax some of these
assumptions and allow for a more nuanced interpretation of our results.
Our core set of results (Table 6) is estimated over a relatively long period of time from
1995 to 2014. Specifically, the long post-treatment period (2002–2014) requires a permanent
and long-lasting “identity effect” to show in our results. It could be argued that events
which are distant in time from the date of the euro adoption could affect our estimation and
limit our ability to detect an effect around that date. To test this, we resorted to several
augmented econometric specifications.
Firstly, we fell back to equation (1) that tested for a “European identity” effect using
classical difference–in–differences analysis on only two time periods (one year before/after).
We increased the time span incrementally by one year up to a maximum of five years but
could discern no statistically significant effects in the interaction term in any of these results.
This suggests that there was no average effect in the short run on feelings of European
identity for euro-adopters.
Secondly, we expanded equation (3) to accommodate higher order polynomial time
trends. This can be done simply by inserting additional squared and/or cubic terms of
timet and interacting these polynomial terms with all terms that contain timet. The result-
ing econometric output is difficult to tabulate due to the complexity of interpreting so many
interaction terms; however, the associated graphical outputs and statistical significance’s are
easy to analyse. Overall, higher order polynomial time trends do little to improve model fit,
frequently mimicked linear fits and the relevant statistical parameters continued to remain
statistically insignificant.
30We also ran additional DiD analyses shortening the window of observations to capture the possibility
of a short-lived jump in identity which would have occurred after the adoption. Doing so, we did not find
any evidence of such a jump. Moreover, joint significance testing of various combinations of β did not reveal
any statistically significant results
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Finally, to be as fully flexible as possible, we implemented a non-parametric form of
equation (3) but leaving out additional controls. This estimation is presented in Figure 5.
At the time of the euro adoption in 2002, average values of European identity increased
leading to a trend break for both euro and non-euro adopting countries. However, Figure
5 suggests that this break was non-differential across euro/non-euro countries, either in the
short-run or long-run, leading to the conclusion that the introduction of the euro did little
to achieve increased feelings of European identity in euro adopting countries. These results
are markedly similar to those presented in Table 6.
Figure 5: Non-parametric smoother of feeling of European Identity for euro/non-euro coun-
tries. Source: Eurobarometer 1995-2014
We also investigated the use of a different dependent variable by employing the ques-
tion: generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the European
Community (Common Market) is ...? 1 A bad thing; 2 Neither Good or Bad; 3 A good
thing. Results suggested a similar picture to our main results on European identity. Sup-
port for EU membership is higher for euro countries than for non-euro countries and the
introduction of the euro caused a marginal trend break from positive to negative. However,
no statistically significant effects could be found for differential effects by euro vs non-euro
countries (in both the short and long run) thereby further suggesting that the introduction
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of the euro did not singularly affect euro-adopting countries.
4.3 Potential Endogeneity of the Euro Treatment and Other Po-
tential Threats to Identification
In this section we discuss several potential concerns that could threaten the identification
of the effect of interest. A key issue when evaluating treatment effects using a difference-
in-differences is to dispel concerns that the treatment may be correlated with unobserved
variables affecting the explained variable. When conducting an analysis with few countries,
it is hard to eliminate with certainty the possibility of confounding unobserved shocks.
We therefore here consider the most likely scenarios of potential confounds: selection bias,
reverse causality, unobserved shocks and spillover effects.
Our results would be biased if the introduction of the euro was triggered by pro–European
sentiments. In that case we would have a selection bias: countries with different levels of
European identity would have different likelihoods to adopt the euro. For example, our
data clearly shows that euro-adopting countries have stronger levels European identity both
before and after the introduction of the euro. This may suggest systematic treatment
assignment and one should therefore limit the interpretation of our results. However, we
note that the historical evidence about the process leading to the euro adoption could suggest
that the introduction was not related to changes in European identity at the time of the
physical introduction of the euro. The adoption of the euro was typically decided politically
many years before its physical introduction. This is particularly clear for the first wave of
countries that switched to the euro in 2002. Their decision to join the common currency
union was not made in 2002, but ten years before when they signed the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992, or more accurately even twelve years before, in 1990, when the prospect of the
European Monetary Union was decided by European countries and its first phase officially
started. Of course, selection into treatment might be occur over the very long which we
may not able to control. This should be kept in mind accordingly.
For reverse causality to be a concern for our analysis, the decision to adopt the euro in
1992, would have to have been made in anticipation of a shock on European feelings around
2002. Such a reverse causality could lead to a null result if the European Head of States
had anticipated in 1992 a drop in European feeling to come in 2002. To counteract that
expected drop in the future, they could have decided to adopt the euro then. The positive
effect of the euro from 2002 onwards would have then perfectly counteract the anticipated
drop in European identity after 2002. The far-fetched nature of such a scenario does not
need to be stressed. In any case, the existing historical evidence points to a very different
process leading to the adoption of the euro. The decision to create the euro was not driven
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by variations in public feeling for or against Europe. Rather, the European integration was
characterised by a top-down approach, see Haas (1967). While we cannot know for sure the
details of how the decision was made, the available historical evidence points to a political
decision process driven by Head of States with little influence from short term feelings about
European identity.
One country stands out though, Denmark. In 2000, this country held a referendum
on the adoption of the euro and voted against it with a margin of 53% to 47%. This
country therefore explicitly selected itself out of the treatment two years before the physical
introduction of the euro.31 This self selection could potentially create a downward bias
against an existing effect of the euro adoption. For it to be the case, Denmark’s trend in
identity should run against the result of the referendum and be on the rise. If a country
like Denmark was experiencing a rise in European identity while being at the same time
more likely to vote against the euro, it would both end up in the control group and bias
downward a potential effect of the euro adoption. Such a link between a positive trend in
European identity and a negative vote against the euro seems unlikely and contradicts the
fact that adopting countries have higher level of European identity. In any case, in order
to check for such possibility, we re-ran our estimates without Denmark in the control group
and found results qualitatively identical in our three models.
Unobserved shocks in a group of countries could also bias our results. For instance, an
unrelated drop in European identity in adopting countries after 2002 could nullify an existing
positive effect of the introduction of the euro. A design that exploits the different timing of
adoption across different countries helps mitigate this concern. Given the staggered entry
in the euro, 30% of the adopting countries joined after 2007. When doing the estimation
on the 2002 group and the post-2002 group we get a very similar result. It suggests that
results are not driven by some time-specific shock over the treated or the control group.
That being said, we see two potential shocks which happened over the period.
In 2004, the UK and Sweden opened their borders to Eastern European workers.32 If
this had led to an increase in European identity it would bias downward our estimates as
these two countries were part of the control group. A cursory look at the time series of
European identity in these two countries does not suggest any jump in European identity
after 2004. Indeed, immigration from Eastern Europe has been associated with a rise in
anti-EU feelings. To make sure this specific shock did not bias our results, we re-ran our
model without the UK and Sweden and without Ireland in the treatment group (a country
which also opened its borders). We find very similar results in our different models when
excluding these countries.
31We thank a careful reviewer for pointing this out.
32We are again grateful to an anonymous referee who pointed this out to us.
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In 2008, the financial crisis hit Europe and turned into a euro crisis for many years.
It is thought that this crisis hurt the support for the euro in euro countries and it may
have decreased feelings of European identity.33 To control for such a possibility, we re-ran
our models without the years post-2008. Here again, we observe the same results with no
evidence that the euro has had a positive impact on euro countries before 2008.34
Finally, we should consider at least two additional effects which could induce a downward
bias in our estimation of an effect of the euro introduction. First, there could have been an
anticipation of the euro introduction in countries adopting the euro before hand. This could
have led to an effect on European identity before the physical introduction of the euro. To
control for such a possibility, we ran additional analyses redefining the treatment variable
post as starting one, two, three years before the physical adoption of the euro. We did not
find any evidence that an effect on European identity occurred before adoption itself.
Second, there could be a spillover effect whereby citizens from non-adopting countries
could feel more European as they visited other countries having the euro. Such a possibility
is indeed present given the rise in European identity for both groups of countries around the
time of the euro adoption. We only estimate the difference in European feelings between
adopting and non-adopting countries so the existence of spillover effects could dampen our
estimates of the effect of euro adoption. We believe such a spillover effect is unlikely to have
been important though. If citizens from non-euro countries were feeling more European as
a consequence of using the euro, we could expect a growing support for the adoption of the
currency. On the contrary, Sweden voted in a referendum not to move towards the adoption
of the euro in 2003, Denmark voted to keep its opt-outs from the EU in 2015 with the same
share of voters who rejected the euro in 2000 and the UK voted to leave the EU in 2016
Overall then, we note that significant identification challenges may still persist in our
data and modelling technique. Results should therefore be interpreted with some caution.
However, with a range of robustness tests in addition to our historical argumentation we
believe that our results are credible and suggest an interesting and counter-intuitive result.
5 The Diffusion of Foreign Euro Coins in France
In this section we study whether sharing symbols of national identity through iconography
on coins increases feelings of European identity. In order to do so, we regress local variations
33This point is actually not completely clear. As the euro crisis unfolded, European news took a large
place in national news coverage, potentially stressing the shared fate of European citizens.
34It is also noteworthy that our models control for economic indicators such as GDP per capita, GDP
growth and unemployment rate. Hence, our models are able to control for some possible effects of different
economic trends.
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in self-declared European identity on the proportion of foreign coins and time and region
fixed effects. Using ordinary least squares, we estimate the model
yrt = β1Proprt + β2Xrt + rt, (4)
where Proprt is the proportion of foreign euro coins and yrt is the mean answer to the
“Moreno” question in the Eurobarometer for region r in year t. As in the previous section,
we use four complementary ways to code this variable. Our results are nevertheless again
unaffected by differences in coding. The location of the French EB survey participants is
registered at the regional level (there are 21 regions France). The vector of time controls
and region fixed-effects is captured in Xrt and rt denotes an error term clustered at the
regional level.
Our main explanatory variable of interest is the local proportion of euro coins found
in the purse of survey respondents (we observe this proportion for the years 2002 - 2007,
2009 and 2011). We set the proportion of foreign coins to zero for one year before the Euro
introduction in 2002.35 Table 7 presents the results. As mentioned before, the estimated
model remains the same within this table but every column uses a different coding of the
dependent variable. We include time and region fixed-effects in every regression and we
employ bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the regional-level.
The proportion of euro coins is never significant in any specification. These conclusions
remain the same if we use robust standard errors. Therefore, the regional changes in stated
feelings of European identity are uncorrelated with the proportion of foreign euro coins
observed locally in French citizens’ purses. It is again also noteworthy that the standard
error estimates are relatively small, between 0.06 and 0.38. Moreover, the R2s are close to
one as the set of time and region dummies captures most of the variation in the dependent
variable. Finally, we also conducted a robustness check similar to the one the previous
section where we excluded all observations after 2007 in order to exclude the possibility
that the results were driven by the financial crisis. Table 9 in the appendix reports those
results. We find that the excluding post-2007 observations does nothing to change our
conclusions except that it increases the standard errors.36
Overall, these results suggest that the relative exposure to foreign euro coins may not
have had a substantial effect on self-declared European identity in France. It also suggests
35But the results remain virtually unchanged if we drop all observations before.
36We also estimated a maximum-likelihood version of a spatial-autoregressive models with spatial-
autoregressive disturbances (SARAR model). In order to do so we collected a symmetric spatial weight
matrix with indicating whether two regions are contiguous or not. We again find that the coefficient on the
proportion of foreign coins is by no means statistically or economically significant using all four definitions
of the dependent variable.
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(1) Continuous (2) Any EU (3) EU first (4) EU only
Proportion of foreign coins at regional level 0.223 0.018 0.123 0.082
(0.34) (0.17) (0.13) (0.06)
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 189 189 189 189
R2 0.996 0.98 0.85 0.68
Table 7: OLS regression with French region level data. Each column estimates the same
model with a different coding of the dependent variable: Continuous (variable is coded
from 1 to 4, 4 being European only); Any European: binary variable, respondent declare a
European identity; European first: binary variable, European identity rank before nation-
ality; European only: binary variable, European identity and no declared national identity.
The sample includes the years 1999, 2002-2007, 2009 and 2011. Standard errors are block-
bootstrapped at the regional level and given in brackets below. *, ** and *** indicate
p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001 respectively.
that the process of identity formation is more complex than previously assumed. In particu-
lar, the exposure of individuals to symbols may have only a limited effect because individuals
might not simply be passive recipients of identity imposed upon them from outside. They
might be active in selecting and processing the symbols surrounding them when defining
whether and how these symbols are relevant for their own identity.37
6 Concluding Remarks
This study examined whether one of the stated political goals of the European monetary
union was achieved: fostering a common European identity. While there is an omnipresent
and controversial debate about the economic costs and benefits of the European Union in
general and the euro in particular, there is little research whether one important political goal
has been reached. This study addressed this deficit by investigating whether the introduction
of the euro favoured a feeling of European identity. We observed that the introduction of
the euro as a common currency had not been followed by a rise in feelings of European
identity in the ‘treated’ countries, even though evidence suggested a general rise in feelings
of European identity for all countries.
This finding is suggestive of the fact the euro did not lead to an increase in European
37For recent evidence from the laboratory suggesting that people might actively choose their identity,
please see Hett, Kro¨ll, and Mechtel (2016) and Paetzel and Sausgruber (2016).
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identity. As mentioned previously, one need a degree of caution when drawing conclusions
from cross-country difference-in-differences as not all possible confound can be excluded
with certainty. For instance, countries who chose to adopt the euro self-selected into the
Eurozone. In practice, they differed in characteristics from non-adopting countries. For a
start, they had a higher level of European identity to start with. To alleviate these concerns
about possible confounds, we conducted a range of robustness checks. Whereas these cannot
in themselves eliminate all confounds, it is notable that they support a causal interpretation
of the results
In a complementary analysis, we do not find evidence of an effect of coins iconography
(sharing symbols of national identity across the Eurozone). Overall these two results con-
verge to support the idea of an absence of evidence that the introduction of the euro was
associated with increased feelings of European identity.
This research brings important insights to the debate on the dynamics of European
integration. More than ten years after the adoption of the euro, the question of identity is
at the heart of European politics. The rejection of the European Constitution by Dutch and
French voters in 2005 ended the attempt to add another significant symbol of nationhood
to the EU. Over the recent years many countries have seen a rise of nationalist and euro–
skeptic parties. In 2016, a country, the UK, voted to leave the EU. Such a decision was
unprecedented in the the history of the European project. Noticeably, while the emergence
of a strong European identity fails to eventuate, regional identities are resurgent (Scotland,
Catalonia, Wallonia). These joint evolutions underlines the difficulty to engineer a new pan-
European identity. In that context, our study suggests that, in spite of high expectations,
the euro may not been a major factor in the building of a European identity. It seems
that either the build-up of a shared European identity takes place on a longer time scale (if
at all), or that other institutional innovations may be better at creating a shared identity.
The move towards a de facto election of the President of the European Commission by
European citizens is, in that regard, also interesting for its potential effect on European
citizens identity.
Beyond that, our study also contributes to the overall understanding of the mechanisms
underlying the formation of social identity. In laboratory experiments it has been found that
small, seemingly irrelevant manipulations in the framing of situations can create artificial
groups generating in-group/out-group dynamics. Our results could be seen to contradict
the laboratory results. We find that a large change in the daily life of citizens, which creates
de facto a shared experience across different countries, did not lead to a greater feeling of
common identity. In the debate on the formation of national identities this result seems to
undermine the constructivist approach which assert that national identity can be engineered
through the creation and communication of common symbols and the creation of institutions
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which induce a shared experience. However, we suspect that rather than dismissing the
constructivist approach in favour of an essentialist one, our result may simply dismiss a
naive version of it. The institutions of the European Union are not in an empty political
and institutional field in their attempt to foster the emergence of a European identity. They
typically face the competition of national institutions and politicians who also activate and
spread symbols of a shared community (Cederman 2001). For instance, whilst the European
Union has attempted to introduce a European dimension in national educational curriculum
(Calligaro 2013), the design of programs remains in the hand of national bodies where the
teaching of history is typically centred around a national narrative.38 The national identity
narrative may also be seized by national politicians who find it easier to use and trigger
existing feelings of identities, rather than to try to create new ones. In that perspective, the
understanding of the emergence/persistence of national identities may call for the emergence
of a political economy of identity where social identities are strategic assets which are the
object of a contest between different political actors.
38See the recent debate in the French reform of history curriculum in primary school where its role in
forming a national identity was explicitly at stake (Monde 2015).
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A Timeline of accession to the EU and to the Eurozone
Country EU Accession
Euro Adoption




















Table 8: List of Euro member states, as of May 2015.
B The Design of Euro Notes and Coins
The ECB Working Group on “Printing and Issuing a European Banknote” (WGPI) initially
planned to leave space for a national feature on the note (partly to allow the UK to have
a representation of the Queen) but this was abandoned in 1998 for security problems and
technical difficulties.39 The decision of the ECB not to include national feature reflected the
39This section is primarily inspired by the detail account of this process from Calligaro (2013).
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fact that the technical aspects of the creation of notes for the common currency trumped the
political considerations of the nation states. Symmetrically the ECB was also independent
from the Commission and the design of the notes was not driven either by an agenda to
foster European identity using the euro iconography. The final choice of the ECB was to
adopt architectural design typical of the European culture but such that “identification with
a given country or region of Europe is avoided”.The design from Robert Kalina, representing
abstract pieces of architectures typical of European history was the one selected.40 As a
consequence of this process and avoidance of “national bias” at all cost, the iconography of
the banknotes do not use symbols typically used on currencies to foster pride in a common
social identity (figures of famous historical figures or existing renowned monuments).
The handing of the design of euro coins to member states led to a markedly different
choice of iconography. While mint directors of the EU member states initially suggested
a small indication of the national origin of the coin, member states did not accept a sim-
ple technical identification. Many of them wanted for the obverse side of the coin to bear
national designs. This desire was either to make the new currency more acceptable to the
population and/or to be able to pursue national iconographic traditions (eg the representa-
tion of monarchs on coins in some countries). The European Commission instead favoured
a design identical in all countries. The final compromise was to enclose national symbols in
the circle of 12 stars of the European flag on the obverse side. Contrary to the national neu-
trality of banknotes, the coin design opted for countries specific symbols to be represented
on each of them.
C Diffusion of Foreign Euro Coins in France – Financial
crisis robustness check: excluding all observations
after 2007.
40Kalina achieved these architectural representations by generating by computer images melding existing
monuments and architectural features, making an identification to an existing building difficult while giving
it identifiable “European” traits.
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(1) Continuous (2) Any EU (3) EU first (4) EU only
Proportion of foreign coins at regional level 0.36 0.22 0.08 0.06
(0.50) (0.29) (0.14) (0.09)
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 147 147 147 147
R2 0.996 0.985 0.849 0.708
Table 9: Great Financial Crisis robustness check: excluding years after 2007. OLS regression
with French region level data. Each column estimates the same model with a different coding
of the dependent variable: Continuous (variable is coded from 1 to 4, 4 being European
only); Any European: binary variable, respondent declare a European identity; European
first: binary variable, European identity rank before nationality; European only: binary
variable, European identity and no declared national identity. Bootstrapped standard errors
clustered at the regional-level are given in brackets below. *, ** and *** indicate p < 0.05,
p < 0.01 and p < 0.001 respectively.
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